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Putting Hate in Its Place: The Codification
of Bias Crime Laws in a Model Penal Code
Anthony M. Dillof*
I. INTRODUCTION
Begun in 1952 and completed in 1962, the drafting of
the Model Penal Code (M.P.C.) constituted an unparalleled
stride forward in the development of the criminal law.
Since 1962 however, our society, crime, and our society's
perception of crime have changed. With the benefit of
hindsight, certain provisions of the Model Penal Code
appear ill conceived, or if not ill conceived, at least
profoundly outdated.' If the Model Penal Code is to be true
to its name, some degree of remodeling is needed. But
remodeling implies more than repair and renovation: It
implies wholesale elimination of some provisions2 and
whole-cloth invention of others. In this latter category of
provisions to be added fall, first, those needed to address
antisocial phenomena that were either unknown or
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law.
A.B. 1981, Harvard University;, J.D. 1985, Columbia University School of Law;
LL.M. 1996 Columbia University School of Law. This Article is to be submitted in
partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of
Law in the School of Law, Columbia University. I thank Kent Greenawalt and
George Fletcher for their thoughtful and helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Model Penal Code art. 213 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) (excluding from sexual offenses, other than deviate sexual intercourse,
possible sexual offenses of husband against wife). Contrary to the Model Penal
Code, the penal codes of most states today provide either no liability exemption or
a limited liability exemption for husbands who commit sexual crimes against
their wives. See Linda Jackson, Note, Marital Rape: A Higher Standard Is in
Order, 1 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 183, 194-97 (1994). The marital rape
exemption has been widely criticized for being unjustified and sexist, if not
unconstitutional. See Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the
Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 45 (1990).
2. A candidate for wholesale elimination would be section 531.3, "Loitering to
Solicit Deviate Sexual Relations," which criminalizes, inter alia, going to a bar in
order to meet and suggest a sexual liaison with a person of the same sex. Model
Penal Code § 531.3 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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uncommon when the M.P.C. was drafted. Examples of
such phenomena are car jacking and computer hacking.
There is a second, less obvious, but equally important,
set of provisions that should be added to the Model Penal
Code. These are provisions needed to address antisocial
phenomena that always existed, but the enormity of which
was not generally recognized. Here bias crimes are a
salient example. Loosely speaking, bias crimes are crimes
committed from racial, religious, and other specified types
of bigotry. Bias crime law laws increase the penalties for
such crimes. Although foreshadowed by federal civil rights
statutes, 3 laws targeting bias crimes explicitly were
relatively rare until fifteen years ago.4  Currently most
jurisdictions in the United States have bias crimes laws of
some type.- They are thus well established members of
modern penal codes. Regardless of how the controversy
concerning their merit ultimately may be resolved,6 their
prevalence today uncontroversially entitles them to at least
a bracketed place in any modern model penal code.
The purpose of this article is to ask generally how bias
3. See, e.g., Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871)
(criminalizing interference with the registration process for federal elections); 18
U.S.C. § 241 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (criminalizing conspiracies to intimidate or
injure people in the exercise of their federal rights); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (criminalizing the act of depriving a person of federal rights under
color of state law).
4. See Geoffrey L. Padgett, Comment, Racially-Motivated Violence and
Intimidation: Inadequate State Enforcement and Federal Civil Rights Remedies,
75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 103 (1984).
5. See Frederick M. Lawrence, Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under
American Law, app. A (1999).
6. Bias crime laws have attracted the critical scrutiny of scholars. See James
B. Jacobs & Kimberly Potter, Hate Crimes: Criminal Law & Identity Politics
(1998) (arguing bias crime laws based primarily on political considerations);
Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical
Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1015, 1049-48 (1997)
(presenting skeptical perspective); Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put
You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy
Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 333 (1991) (challenging
consistency of bias crime laws and free speech). For a recent defense of bias crime
laws based on the society's duty to provide equal protection from crime to
different potential victims, and a response to that defense, see Alon Harel &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Hate and Equality, 109 Yale L. Rev. 507 (1999).
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crime laws should best be formulated. While model bias
crime laws have been drafted,7 none have been drafted with
an eye toward the Model Penal Code." This article focuses
on the question how should bias crime laws be formulated
in the context of a possible revised Model Penal Code. As a
methodological matter, because the contours and contents
of any such revised code cannot be confidently predicted,
this article assumes that a revised M.P.C. will leave much
of the structure of the current M.P.C. intact. Undoubtedly,
a revised Model Penal Code will retain one of the Model
Penal Code's most important and distinctive features: its
claim to being an integrated code. In contrast to its
common law-based processors, the Model Penal Code is
more than a compilation of diverse offenses and assorted
defenses.9 The M.P.C. is built around a "general part"
which includes generally applicable rules of interpretation,
burden assignment, causation, and complicity.10 It employs
a consistent vocabulary informed by a central set of
definitions." It provides an array of intelligent default
rules to answer the otherwise overwhelming number of
questions that might arise concerning mens rea
requirements. 12  It possesses a logical organizational
structure to enhance accessibility. In addition, by
employing a limited number of well-defined terms, it
aspires to efficiency and precision of expression.
7. See Civil Rights Division, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Hate
Crime Statutes: A Response to Anti-Semitism, Vandalism, and Violent Bigotry,
A.D.L. Law Rep. 1, Spring/Summer 1988, at app. A, Lawrence, supra note 5, at
170-71.
8. There have, of course, been bias crime laws drafted for M.P.C.-based penal
codes. In the course of this article, I shall reference various drafting alternatives
that have been adopted.
9. See Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?):
The Challenge of the Special Part, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 297, 297 (1998) (before
M.P.C., "many jurisdictions had previously been content with relatively loosely
organized compilations of the accumulated criminal statutes passed over the
years, many of which simply embodied or assumed traditional common law
rules).
10. See Model Penal Code §§ 1.02, 1.12, 2.02, 2.03, 2.06 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985).
11. See id. § 1.13.
12. See id. § 2.02.
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A bias crime law for a possible revised Model Penal
Code should be drafted in light of these virtues. Rather
than merely being haphazardly tacked onto a highly
integrated structure, a bias crime law for a model penal
code should be drafted in a manner to fit seamlessly within
the Code's overall organization and to interact properly
with the Code's other provisions. For the purposes of this
article, fit and functionality therefore will be the guiding
considerations. From this goal follows the article's
structure: Part II.A considers formulations of bias crime
laws that would place such laws in the general part of the
Model Penal Code. Part II.A specifically examines bias as
(1) a general type of culpability condition, and (2) as a
general factor relevant to sentencing, with attention to the
constitutional issues thereby raised. Part II.B considers
formulations of bias crime laws that would place them in
the specific part of the Code. Given this placement, it
examines how they would thereby interact with the
provisions of the Code's general part, specifically, the
Code's provisions concerning complicity, transferred intent,
attempt, culpability, and the choice of evils defense.
No one formulation of bias crime laws is advanced as
being the uniquely right one. Rather, the advantages and
disadvantages of different formulations are explored in a
systematic fashion. In this manner, the implications of one
formulation versus another may be better understood if
and when the time comes for revising the Model Penal
Code.
II. FORMULATING BIAS CRIME PROVISIONS
The Model Penal Code is a code of two parts. The first
part is entitled "General Provisions," the second,
"Definitions of Specific Offenses." This distinction between
the general and the specific reflects a vision of the criminal
law held by many leading scholars and employed as an
organizing principle in their work. 3  The distinction
13. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law (1997); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's
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embodies the important insight that there are general
principles, rules, concepts, constraints, and structures that
pervade, control, and inform all of the specific offenses. 4
Matters treated in the M.P.C.'s general part include
culpability, mistakes, complicity, justifications, excuse, and
attempts. 15 By virtue of this general part and its unifying
effect, the Model Penal Code may claim to have
transformed criminal laws into criminal law. This
fundamental distinction between the general and the
specific parts of the M.P.C. generates a fundamental
question in thinking about bias crime laws in the context of
a possible revised Model Penal Code: Should the provisions
establishing a bias crime law be placed in the Code's
general of specific part? Certainly something is to be said
for placing a provision where it "belongs." A code should be
accessible. The definition of peijury should not be hidden
among the subsections on the justified use of force. The
question whether a bias crime provision belongs in the
general or specific part of the code, however, is not simply
the question whether a section number of 200 or greater
should be assigned to it. Rather, the question goes to the
heart of the issue of how bias crime laws should be thought
of and formulated.
A. Bias Crime Laws as Provisions of the General Part
This section considers bias crime laws as components
of the Model Penal Code's general part. Bias crime laws
have a claim to a home in the M.P.C.'s general part by
virtue of their derivative nature and potentially unlimited
applicability. Many bias crime laws are formulated to
establish what may be referred to "second-order" offenses.
Rather than containing an explicit definition of the conduct
which, when engaged in because of bias, will constitute a
Criminal Law (15th ed. 1993); George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law
(1978); Glanville Williams, The Criminal Law: The General Part (2d ed. 1961).
14. See Fletcher, supra note 13, § 6.1.
15. See Model Penal Code §§ 2.02, 2.04, 2.06, 3.02, 2.09, 5.01 (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985).
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bias crime, many bias crime laws incorporate other offenses
by reference and use their occurrence as a predicate for the
commission of a bias crime.16  For example, a simplified
version of such a bias crime law might define a bias crime
as "an assault, battery, or act of criminal mischief
committed because of bias." This derivative formulation is
not a feature of most specific offenses. Furthermore, bias
crime laws are sometimes drafted to incorporate prior-
defined offenses generally.17 A simplified version of such a
law might define a bias crime as "a crime committed
because of bias." Under such a provision, there could as
much be a bias crime based on forgery as assault. Because
the punishment for a bias crime is usually a function of the
underlying offense, it makes sense to speak of distinct
forms of bias crimes, such as bias-assaults or bias-thefts,
even though a single code provision might be the basis of
all the possible bias-crime charges. In this respect, bias
crime laws resemble a prominent member of the M.P.C.'s
general part: attempts. As with bias crimes, there is no
such thing as an attempt simpliciter. To be liable for an
attempt, one must be liable for either an attempted
murder, an attempted rape, or some other attempted
offense. The type of offense attempted determines the
applicable punishment. Because of this derivative
definitional structure, attempts, while a distinct set of
substantive offenses, are formally unlike the offenses found
16. See 720 IlM. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-7.1 (West Supp. 1999) (establishing as
predicate offenses for bias crimes assault, battery, aggravated assault,
misdemeanor theft, criminal trespass, disorderly conduct, and harassment among
others); see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:107.2(A) (West Supp. 2000); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 207.185 (Michie 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.12 (Anderson
1996); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2710 (West 1983); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.645
(West 1996).
17. See, e.g., 11 Del Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1304(a) (1999) (creating hate crime
liability for "[amny person who commits, or attempts to commit, any crime as
defined by the laws of this State, and who intentionally.., selects the victim
because of the victim's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin or ancestry, shall be guilty of a hate crime.") (emphasis added); Md. Ann.
Code art 27, § 470A (1996) (creating hate crime liability for any person who
"fh]arass[es] or commit[s] a crime upon a person... because of that person's race,
color, religious beliefs, or national origin.").
18. Model Penal Code § 5.01 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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in the specific part. Just as attempts fit into the general
part, because of their derivative and general nature, so
arguably do bias crimes.
1. Bias as a Culpability Condition
If bias crime laws have a general aspect to them, how
should they be incorporated into the general part of the
M.P.C.? Let me begin to answer this question by offering
an innovative proposal. Although I will ultimately conclude
that it has significant drawbacks, the proposal more
completely integrates bias crime laws into the woof and
warp of the M.P.C. than any other formulation of a bias
crime law.
A common feature of all bias crime laws is that the
existence of bias, however defined, triggers an
enhancement of the penalty range to which the perpetrator
is exposed. While the definition and scope of bias may vary
among different bias crime laws,19 bias at a minimum is a
type of mental state which may be precisely defined
without recourse to normative terms.0 In this respect, bias
resembles the four culpability conditions established by the
M.P.C.: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.
Furthermore, like purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence, bias is a mental state that arguably bears on an
actor's culpability for the prohibited conduct or result he is
alleged to have engaged in or caused. Many would consider
the assault of a person simply because of his skin color, for
example, a particularly deplorable act, one which clearly
manifests an unusually wicked character.2'
19. While most bias crime laws cover bias based on race, national origin, and
religion, they vary regarding coverage of bias based on gender, sexual-orientation,
diaability, and veteran status. See Lawrence, Punishing Hate, supra note 5, app.
A (comparing different forms of bias that are elements of different state bias
crime laws).
20. In composing the M.P.C.'s section on culpability, the drafters of the M.P.C.
sought to avoid vague and normatively-charged mens rea terms like "malicious"
and "willfifl." See Model Penal Code § 2.02 cmt. at 230 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985).
21. See James Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime
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Frederick Lawrence has written that this culpability-
based rationale is in fact the one espoused by "most
supporters" of bias crime laws.22 Lawrence explains that
"[tihe motivation of the bias criminal violates the equality
principle, one of the most deeply held tenets in our legal
system and our culture."2
Likewise, one might consider a person who engages in
prohibited conduct because of bias particularly dangerous
to society and its egalitarian values, just as a person who
engages in such conduct purposely might be thought to be a
greater threat than a person who does so merely
negligently.
Finally, bias is distinguishable from certain mental
states that are elements of offenses because of the wide
range of conduct to which bias is thought relevant. Some
M.P.C. mental states, such as "extreme indifference to the
value of human life"2A or "the purpose of arousing or
gratifying sexual desire,"25 only make sense as a liability
element for the offense in which they appear. In contrast,
acting based on bias seems equally relevant to a wide range
of criminal misconduct.
In sum, because bias, like the four basic culpability
conditions of the M.P.C., is a mental state, is arguably
relevant to culpability and dangerousness, and is
applicable to a wide range of offenses, there is a strong
prima facie reason to treat it like these other culpability
conditions. Specifically, there is a strong prima facie
reason to include it among the kinds of culpability defined
by M.P.C.'s central culpability section, section 2.02.
Here then is a possible formulation of a bias crime law
for the Model Penal Code. First, introduce a new
Legislation: Where's the Speech?, Crim. Just. Ethics, Fall/Summer 1992, at 6, 9
("beating someone because of animosity to the color of his skin is, at least
according to my intuition, more morally reprehensible than hitting someone
because of a dispute about a parking space.").
22. Lawrence, Punishing Hate, supra note 5, at 61.
23. Id.
24. Model Penal Code § 210.2(l)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) (murder).
25. Id. § 213.5 (indecent exposure).
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culpability definition into section 2.02(2) specifying the
mental state needed to constitute a bias crime. Bias crimes
are often called "hate crimes." To be consistent with the
adverbial constructions of the M.P.C.'s other culpability
conditions ("purposely," etc.), this new culpability condition
might be called "hatefully.'"2 The "hatefully" provision
would be inserted as a new subsection (a) of section 2.02(2)
because the mental states therein are listed in order of
decreasing liability or sentencing implications. Acting
because of bias would be a higher form of culpability than
acting merely purposefully because of the greater penalties
that would result. Second, subsections 2.02(3) and 2.02(5),
establishing the default culpability and the substitute
culpability requirements, would have to be modified to
accommodate the new culpability condition. Finally, with
this foundational work done, bias-forms of selected specific
offenses would have to be drafted. For example, a bias-
assault provision could be added as a third subsection to
section 211.1. Such a section might provide:
(3) Bias Assault. A person is guilty of a bias assault if he
hatefully:
(a) attempts to cause, or causes, bodily injury to another; or
(b) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of serious
bodily injury; or
26. While "hatefully" connects neatly to the term "hate crime," it is misleading
insofar as it suggests that to be liable for a bias, a perpetrator must be motivated
by the emotion of hate. Some bias crime laws require only that the perpetrator
"selects" his victim because of a specified characteristic of the victim. See, e.g.,
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.645 (West 1996). Under such laws, the nature of the desire
informing the selection decision would be irrelevant. Even those that employ the
label of "hate-motivated crimes" and require animus of some type, see, e.g., Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1455 (1998) (requiring perpetrator to be "maliciously
motivated"), would probably be satisfied under a cooler variety of aversion than
hatred. These important nuances of scope are explored in Kent Greenwalt,
Reflections on Justifications for Defining Crimes by the Category of Victim,
1992/1993 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 617, 617-20. I take no position here on the
substantive issue of the precise mental state needed for bias crime liability.
Rather, I note that if the term "hatefully" were used in a revised Model Penal
Code as a culpability term, it would have to be explicitly defined as are the other
culpability terms, and the definition might have to vary somewhat from the
ordinary usage of "hatefully."
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(c) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes
such injury under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life; or
(d) attempts to cause or causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon.
Bias assault under paragraphs (a) or (b) is a felony of the _
degree; bias assault under paragraph (c) is a felony of the _
degree; bias assault under paragraph (d) is a felony of the _
degree.
Establishing bias crime laws by including bias as a
general culpability condition, implemented by additions to
various offense definitions, has a number of advantages.
First, there are the advantages generally associated with
the M.P.C.'s centralized culpability approach. A definition
of bias would be established that would apply consistently
across many offenses. Likewise, the relation of bias to the
other M.P.C. culpability conditions would, through
subsections 2.02(3) and (5), be established in a manner that
would also apply consistently across many offenses.
Second, drafting bias provisions for each offense would
provide an opportunity for great drafting precision. Such
precision is a central rationale for the M.P.C.'s "elemental
approach"27 to mens rea. Under the common law, a
shotgun general-intent approach was employed either
alone or supplemented by a relatively primitive specific-
intent requirement for some conduct or result elements. In
contrast, the elemental approach permits one of four
culpability conditions to be individually assigned to each
material element of an offense, allowing different
culpability conditions to be assigned to different material
elements within a given offense.
This greater precision and flexibility may be needed
for bias offenses with multiple material elements. The
M.P.C., for example, provides that a person is guilty of
27. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining
Criminal Liability- The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681




disorderly conduct "if, with the purpose to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a
risk thereof, he. . . engages in fighting or threatening, or
in violent or tumultuous behavior."28 Exactly what would
be required for the offense of bias disorderly conduct? Does
this offense require a person to want to cause public
inconvenience because of bias, as would members of the Ku
Klux Klan who might march near Harlem in a threatening
manner hoping to cause a traffic jam that would
inconvenience African-American residents of Harlem? Or
would the offense require a person to engage in fighting or
threatening because of bias, as would members of the Ku
Klux Klan who might threaten African-American
bystanders seen in the course of a march in Mid-town
Manhattan? A specifically formulated bias disorderly
conduct provision, based on a general definition of
"hatefully" in section 2.02(2), could avoid such ambiguity.
It might, for example, provide that bias disorderly conduct
requires "hatefully creating a risk of public inconvenience,"
as opposed to requiring that the perpetrator "hatefully
engages in fighting or threatening."
Finally, formulating bias crime laws based on a central
section 2.02(2) definition would avoid a problem that
infects other versions of bias crime laws. As discussed in
the next Part, bias crimes may be defined along the lines of
"crimes committed because of bias." Such a simple
definition, however, raises complex problems of application.
Specifically, when the definition of a bias crime includes
the term "crime," it is unclear whether "crimes" should
include those crimes committed through complicity, those
where the actor's intent and the actual result diverge, those
merely attempted crimes, and those for which there may be
a defense. Because the potentially ambiguous term "crime"
is not employed, these issues would not arise if bias were
defined in section 2.02 and then, like other culpability
terms, incorporated into the definitions of the various
specific offenses. Proceeding in this manner would raise no
28. Id. § 250.2(a).
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novel problems of statutory interpretation. Rather,
because bias would be treated analogously to the M.P.C.'s
standard culpability states, issues regarding bias-attempts,
bias-complicity, etc. would be resolved analogously.
Nevertheless, adding bias as a general culpability term
carries two serious disadvantages. First, many lengthy
additions would have to be made to the M.P.C. The bias-
assault provisions above are just an example of what would
have to be added to every offense for which it was thought
a bias-version was desirable. The M.P.C. has already been
criticized for its length.29  The drafting approach
exemplified by the bias-assault provision above would give
that criticism greater force. The increased clarity achieved
would not be worth the substantial increase in bulk and
commensurate decrease in accessibility of the Code. For
this reason, the general culpability approach to bias crimes
likely fails as a practical drafting option.
The second reason for not treating bias as a general
culpability term challenges the underlying motivation for
including bias in section 2.02. According to this objection,
bias, while superficially resembling purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence, does not in fact bear on moral
culpability, as do the standard four conditions, and so
should not be treated for purposes of drafting as a
culpability condition. The argument that the existence of
bias does not increase a person's moral culpability for his
conduct runs as follows. Moral culpability, or
blameworthiness, is essentially a matter of responsibility,
or accountability. 0 The reason that a person's awareness
of risk, knowledge, and purpose is relevant to a person's
moral culpability for wrongful conduct is that each state
establishes an increasing level of responsibility for the
29. See Paul H. Robinson, Structure and Function in the Criminal Law 185
(1997).
30. See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 495 ("The question of fair accountability is
expressed in assaying whether the accused can be fairly blamed for his
wrongdoing."); Christine Sistare, Agent Motives and the Criminal Law, 13 Soc.
Theory & Prac. 303, 309 (1987) ("Just as both responsibility and illegality are
required for liability, so both responsibility and fault are required for
culpability.").
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conduct. A person is most responsible for a result when it
is his purpose to cause it because, through his values and
desires, he becomes committed to the result's occurring. A
person is significantly responsible for a result when he
knows his acts will cause it because acting with such
knowledge implies a full acceptance of such a result. A
person is less responsible for such a result when she is
merely aware of the risk of the result because acting in
light of the risk shows a willingness to accept the result,
but one that may be tempered by the hope that it will not
occur. The criminal law reflects these relative levels of
responsibility. A person who purposely tries to cause the
death of another, but does not, is subject to greater liability
than a person who is practically certain that his acts will
cause a death, even if they do not."' A person who
knowingly causes a death is subject to greater liability than
a person who recklessly causes a death. 2
Bias, however, does not increase one's responsibility
for a given wrongdoing. If Defendant 1 punches Victim 1
because he was paid to, and Defendant 2 punches Victim 2
because Victim 2 is Jewish, they are equally responsible for
the wrongdoing of punching a person who does not deserve
to be punched. The purposeful, or perhaps the purposeful
and premeditated,"5 causing of a harm for its own sake
represents maximal responsibility for the harm and so
maximal moral culpability. Rather than increasing the
degree of one's responsibility, bias increases the scope of
one's responsibility. Defendant 3 assaults Victim 3, a Jew,
because he believes Victim 3 is Jewish. Defendant 4, not
realizing that Victim 4 is a Jew, assaults Victim 4, because
he believes Victim 4 is carrying a lot of money. Based on
31. Attempted murder is a felony of the second degree; reckless endangerment
is merely a misdemeanor. Compare Model Penal Code §§ 5.01 (attempt), 5.05
(grading) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985), with id. § 211.2 (recklessly
endangering another person).
32. Murder is a felony of the first degree; manslaughter is a felony of the
seoond degree. Compare id. § 210.2(1)(2) (murder), with id. § 210.3(1)(2)
(manslaughter).
38. Various criminal codes reserve the harshest penalties for those homicides
committed with premeditation. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West 1991).
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Defendant 2's subjective understanding of his action, we
might say that Defendant 2 is responsible for assaulting "a
person who is Jewish." In contrast, based on Defendant 4's
subjective understanding of his action, Defendant 4 is
responsible for assaulting "a person who is carrying a lot of
money." While acting because of bias increases the scope of
a person's responsibility, it does not do so in a morally
significant way. Being Jewish neither raises nor lowers a
person's moral worth, just as carrying a lot of money
neither raises nor lowers a person's moral worth.
Consequently, Defendant 3 and Defendant 4 are equally
morally culpable for all morally significant aspects of their
actions.34
The foregoing argument was intended to show that
bias motivation does not increase an actor's moral
culpability for a given intentional wrongdoing. Even if this
argument is not accepted, however, it at least demonstrates
that bias does not bear on culpability for wrongdoing in the
manner that the traditional M.P.C. culpability states do.
Purpose and knowledge, and even recklessness (understood
as being aware of the possibility of an event) and
negligence (understood as having grounds for being aware
of the possibility of an event) are not mental states that are
inherently immoral. They only create moral culpability
depending on their content, for example having the purpose
of or being recklessness about causing physical or
emotional harm to another. In contrast, bias, implying an
erroneous devaluation of another based on certain
characteristics of personal or cultural significance, entails a
character flaw and grounds for moral criticism. Bias is a
much narrower and value-specific mental state than the
traditional M.P.C. culpability states. This point may be
34. Acting because of bias, admittedly, has some moral implications. If a
person who acts wrongfully is motivated by bias, he cannot be motivated by some
consideration that might diminish his responsibility for the wrongdoing. A person
who destroys property because of bias cannot plead that he acted based on some
exculpatory motive such as the desire to prevent a greater harm to others. While
acting based on bias therefore may preclude an actor's responsibility from being
mitigated, it still cannot increase it.
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made in terms of section 2.02's general function of
establishing mens rea requirements. Purpose, knowledge,
recklessness and negligence are determinants of legal
culpability because they represent attitudes (broadly
construed) toward the material elements of an offense.
Bias is not an attitude toward a material element, but an
attitude toward the race, religion, or other specified
characteristic of the victim. Such specified victim
characteristics are not material elements of any M.P.C.
offense, or, indeed, any existing penal code offense. To
incorporate bias into section 2.02 would at a minimum
suggest a false analogy between it and the M.P.C.'s
standard culpability states. The structure of a penal code
should reflect the substantive nature of its elements.
Accordingly, bias does not deserve a place in the M.P.C.'s
pantheon of culpability-creating mental states.
2. Bias As a Sentencing Factor
An alternative formulation of bias crime laws that
places them in the M.P.C.'s general part is one that treats
bias as a sentencing factor. Currently, the M.P.C. provides
little guidance or structure for courts in determining
sentences within the generally wide sentencing ranges for
diffrent degrees of misdemeanors and felonies.35 Within
the statutorily prescribed range, courts are generally given
full discretion to select a sentence in light of a pre-sentence
investigation. 6  The only exception to prescribed
sentencing ranges is the M.P.C.'s provision for extended
terms, which the M.P.C. generally reserves for defendants
the court finds to be persistent offenders or professional
criminals." If bias were to be incorporated in the M.P.C.
as a factor relevant to sentencing, the most natural means
would be to insert a provision in sections 7.03 and 7.04 to
permit the court to order an extended prison term upon a
35. See Model Penal Code §§ 6.06, alternative 6.06, 6.09 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985).
36. Id. § 7.07.
37. Id. §§ 6.07, 6.09, 7.03, 7.04.
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finding that the defendant acted because of bias."
a. The Constitutional Question
A number of states,39  as well as the federal
government, 40 have chosen to establish increased penalties
for bias crimes by treating the existence of bias as an
aggravating sentencing factor to be determined by a trial
judge after a sentencing hearing. A serious question,
however, has recently arisen regarding whether this
popular approach is legally viable. In November 1999, the
38. Such an addition would fit comfortably with other possible revisions to the
M.P.C.'s sentencing provisions. As the Code's Commentaries recognize, there has
arisen concern, not without merit, that wide sentencing discretion invites
inconsistency in sentencing and produces resentment among those subject to it.
Model Penal Code pt. I §§ 6.01-7.09 cmt. at 11-12 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985). A revised Code would very likely incorporate discretion-
limiting provisions of one type or another.
39. See e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.155(c)(22) (Michie 1998) (permitting
increase beyond presumptive term for offenses); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-
702(c)(14) (West Supp. 1999) (establishing bias as aggravating factor within
standard range of possible sentences); Cal. Penal Code § 433.75(a) (West 1999)
(permitting additional term of up to three years); Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 775.085(1)(a)
(West Supp. 2000) (mandating one-step increase in misdemeanor or felony type);
Iowa Code Ann. § 712.9 (West 1993) (mandating one-step increase in
misdemeanor or felony type); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-111 (Michie Supp. 1998) (
mandating one-step increase in misdemeanor or felony type for specified
offenses); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999) (mandating extended
sentence); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-38 (Supp. 1999) (mandating additional term of
imprisonment); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.47 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (mandating
one-step increase in misdemeanor or felony type); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1455
(1998 & Supp. 1999) (permitting increase in maximum sentence or to statutory
maximum defined for offense); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.645 (West 1996) (sometimes
permitting and sometimes mandating increase in maximum sentence).
40. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.1(a) (1995). Section
3Al.1(a) provides:
If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the
object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any
person, increase by 3 levels.
Although Congress has considered legislation making the commission of a bias
crime a federal offense, see the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, S. 622, 106th
Cong. (1999); H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999), Congress to date has not enacted
such legislation.
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United States Supreme Court agreed to review Apprendi v.
New Jersey.41 Apprendi directly raises the issue whether
the Constitution permits a court to increase a defendant's
sentence based on its own finding of bias. This issue is part
of the larger one of the constitutionality of permitting facts
found at the sentencing phase of the trial, rather than the
liability-determination phase, to have an impact on the
range of penalties that a defendant is exposed to. This
issue has attracted significant scholarly attention.42 I shall
consider it relatively briefly.
In New Jersey v. Apprendi,4' the New Jersey Supreme
Court considered the appeal of Charles Apprendi.
Apprendi had pled guilty to two counts of possession of a
firearm for unlawful purpose and one count of unlawful
possession of a prohibited weapon, second and third degree
felonies respectively, with the sentence for the latter to run
concurrently." As a second-degree crime, possession of a
firearm for an unlawful purpose exposed Apprendi to a
penalty of five to ten years.45  The state, however,
consistent with its plea agreement, applied for an extended
sentence under New Jersey's hate crimes law. This law
would permit a doubling of the maximum and minimum
sentence of a second-degree crime.4  On the basis of a
hearing prior to sentencing, the trial court concluded that
Apprendi's acts were the product of racial bias and
41. 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
42. See, e.g., Note, Awaiting the Mikado: Limiting Legislative Discretion to
Define Criminal Elements and Sentencing Factors, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1349 (1999);
Richard G. Singer & Mark D. Knoll, Searching for the 'Tail of the Dog": Finding
"Elements" of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 1057 (1999); Frank R. Herrmann, 30=20: "Understanding" Maximum
Senience Enhancements, 46 Buff. L. Rev. 175 (1998); Benjamin J. Priester,
Further Developments on Previous Symposia: Sentenced for a "Crime" the
Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the Constitutional
Limitations on the Factfinding by Sentence Factors Rather Than Elements of the
Offse, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 249 (1998); Susan N. Herman, The Tail That
Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 289 (1992).
43. 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999).
44. Id. at 487.
46. Id.
46. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e), 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
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sentenced him on one of the unlawful purpose counts to an
extended term of twelve years imprisonment with four
years of parole ineligibility.47
Apprendi challenged the imposition of the extended
sentence on the ground that it was imposed without due
process. Specifically, Apprendi argued that by permitting
the court to find bias based on a preponderance of evidence
presented at the sentencing hearing, New Jersey had
violated the requirement of In Re Winship48 that every
element of an offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Apprendi did not deny that under New Jersey law, bias
functioned as a sentencing factor. Rather, he contended
that because the existence of bias would result in an
increased penalty range, bias must be characterized as an
offense element for constitutional purposes.
If a fact is determined to be an element of an offense, a
bevy of constitutional consequences follow. Not only must
the fact be found beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant
also has the right to demand that the finding be made by a
jury, where he will have the right to confront witnesses and
to enjoy compulsory process.49 Likewise, the fact must be
charged in an indictment and submitted to a grand jury
where appropriate. 0 Thus, Apprendi's appeal addressed
the lynchpin issue: when should a fact that bears on the
range of punishments to which a defendant is exposed be
deemed an offense element?
The Supreme Court has long struggled with this
question in one guise or another. In Mullaney v. Wilbur,5
the Court held that where Maine had defined first-degree
murder to exclude killing in the heat of passion, it must
bear the burden of proving that fact beyond a reasonable
doubt. In Patterson v. New York,52 the Court held that
where New York had established that murder would be
47. Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 487.
48. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
49. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, VII.
50. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
51. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
52. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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mitigated to manslaughter based on a finding of "extreme
emotional disturbance," it would be able to place the
burden of demonstrating this fact on the defendant. The
homicide statutes at issue in Mullaney and Patterson were
close in substance. Both provided that a defendant who
was adequately provoked would be liable for manslaughter
rather than murder. In order to uphold the New York
statute, the Court in Patterson rejected a broad reading of
Mullaney under which:
the State may not permit the blameworthiness of an act or
the severity of punishment authorized for its commission to
depend on the presence or absence of an identified fact
without assuming the burden of proving the presence or
absence of the fact, as the case may be, beyond a reasonable
doubt.58
According to the Patterson Court, the flaw of the
Maine statute was that Maine had, with one hand,
established lack of provocation as an element of murder (by
defining murder in terms of malice aforethought, which
implied an absence of heat of passion) and had, with the
other hand, permitted it to be found simply based on proof
of an intentional killing.5 4 According to the Court, this
implementation of the law allowed the absence of heat of
passion to be presumed. In contrast, "nothing was
presumed or implied against Patterson."55 In Patterson, the
Court was clear that its holding was premised on the desire
to leave states free to structure criminal offenses as they
wished. Such freedom, the Court noted, might often accrue
to the benefit of defendants as states established factors
that, if shown by defendants, would defeat an offense. 6
Such a mitigating factor, even when the proof fell to the
defendant, was better than nothing at all.
Nevertheless, the question remained: In what sense
58. Id. at 214.
54. Id. at 215-16.
55. Id. at 216.
56. Id. at 215 n.15.
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had Maine ever established that absence of heat of passion
was a fact the State had to prove, given that it ultimately
allocated proof of its existence to the defendant? Was the
New York statute constitutional only because New York
had more clearly labeled the proof requirements for various
elements in the first place? If so, could the requirements of
the due process clause be eviscerated through the simple
stratagem of labeling a traditional offense element "not an
offense element"? To these concerns the court stated:
This view may seem to permit state legislatures to
reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative
defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined
in their statutes. But there are obviously constitutional
limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard.
"[Ilt is not within the province of a legislature to declare an
individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." The
legislature cannot "validly command that the finding of an
indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the accused,
should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts
essential to guilt."5"
These constitutional limits-no liability based on a
mere indictment or proof of identity-are exceedingly
minimal. Even if they are not exhaustive, but merely
illustrative, they suggested that states would, for all
practical purposes, have carte blanche to allocate (but just
not reallocate) facts to the defendant's case.
Following Patterson, starting in 1984, the Court
decided a string of cases in which the issue was not "what
facts can be allocated to the defendant to disprove by a
preponderance of the evidence," but "what facts can be
allocated to the sentencing phase of adjudication so that
they merely need be proved by a preponderance of
evidence?"5 8  These cases culminated in the 1999 case,
57. See id. at 210 (citations omitted).
58. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998) (holding that Double-
Jeopardy Clause is not implicated when offenses differ because facts determined
at sentencing, not trial); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)
(holding statutory maximum sentence may be increased by sentencing hearing
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United States v. Jones.5 9  Jones was a statutory
interpretation case. The statute before the Court was a
federal car jacking statute that permitted higher penalties
for car jackings that resulted in serious bodily injury and
death. At issue was whether, pursuant to the statute,
resultant serious bodily injury or death was an element of
the offense, which therefore had to be found beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury, or was a sentencing factor, in
which case one or the other merely had to be found by the
trial court to have been established by a preponderance of
the evidence. Here a five-justice majority invoked the
doctrine of constitutional doubt to hold that the existence of
resulting serious bodily injury or death was an element of
the offense. According to this doctrine, where possible,
statutes should be construed in a matter that would not
call their constitutionality into doubt.60  The Court
concluded that whether the determination of a fact that
increased statutory sentencing range could be taken from
the jury and given to a court at sentencing "raise[d] a
genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled."61
The Court appears evenly balanced on the question of
how this issue should be settled. In Jones, two justices,
Stevens and Scalia, seemed adamant that such a statute,
like the statute Apprendi, would be unconstitutional. In
his concurrence, Justice Stevens stated flatly, "I am
convinced that it is unconstitutional for a legislature to
remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase
the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
finding of recidivsim); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam)
(holding that capital sentencing determination could be made by judge); McMillan
v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (upholding a sentencing hearing
deternination of fact that established a mandatory minimum sentence); Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 457-65 (1984) (per curiam) (rejecting argument that
capital sentencing must be decided by a jury).
59. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
60. See Roberta Sue Alexander, Note, Dueling Views of Statutory
Interpretation and The Canon of Constitutional Doubt: Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), 24 U. Dayton L. Rev. 375, 388-90 (1999)
(discussing versions of constitutional doubt doctrine held by different justices).
61. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
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defendant is exposed."62 Likewise, Justice Scalia, in his
concurrence, opined that in his "considered view," it is
unconstitutional "to remove from the jury the assessment
of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed."63 The
hate crime law in Apprendi would run afoul of these
principles because the determination of bias after an
adjudication of guilt would double the range of penalties a
defendant would be exposed to. Both justices referenced
earlier opinions in which they, in the minority, had clearly
staked out their positions4 Their concern clearly was the
concern flagged but dismissed in Patterson: allowing
sentence-determining facts to be found by less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury would allow the
constitutional protections guaranteed a defendant to be
circumvented.6 5
The four dissenters in Jones appear equally firmly
committed to the contrary position that in general no
constitutional issues are implicated by a sentencing factor
that raises the maximum possible penalty. The dissent
obliquely suggested that it might have constitutional
concerns in cases where the factor constituted distinct
culpable conduct that a legislature might wish to punish
independently. 66 The dissent, however, characterized the
sentencing factor in Jones, serious bodily harm or death, as
the result of conduct rather than conduct itself, and would
62. Id. at 252 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. See id. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 254 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Steven, J.,
dissenting) ("It would demean the importance of the reasonable-doubt standard
- indeed, it would demean the Constitution itself-if the substance of the
standard could be avoided by nothing more than a legislative declaration that
prohibited conduct is not an 'element! of a crime."); Monge, 524 U.S. at 740 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the California legislature ... may have stumbled upon
the El Dorado sought by many in vain since the beginning of the Republic: a
means of dispensing with inconvenient constitutional 'rights.'").
66. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 255 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Although it provided
no example, the dissent might have imagined a hypothetical statute that
increased the statutory maximum penalty for assault upon a sentencing-hearing
finding that the defendant unlawfully took the victim's property after the assault.
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undoubtedly find that acting because of bias was not
distinct culpable conduct. In reaching its conclusion, the
dissent did not attempt to weigh the competing interests of
a states' freedom to define offenses against a defendant's
interest in having a jury determine facts significantly
bearing on his punishment. Rather, the dissent relied on
two other arguments. First, the dissent contended that
prior decisions of the Court foreclosed the issue. Here the
dissent cited powerful precedent including Patterson, a
subsequent case that upheld the use of a sentencing factor
to raise the statutory minimum sentence,67 and finally a
case that upheld the use of the defendants' recidivism as a
sentencing factor to increase the statutory maximum.
Second, the dissent challenged the majority to define
the implications of the position it found to be
constitutionally unsettled. Would this position invalidate
only those sentencing schemes including a factor that
raised the statutory maximum for the offense, or would it
also invalidate those sentencing schemes including a factor
that raised the maximum penalty within the statutorily
defined range?69 An example of the latter type of scheme
would be one in which the offense of unlawful possession of
a weapon carried a sentence of five to twenty years, but the
relevant sentencing scheme provided that a sentence
exceeding ten years could only be imposed based on a
finding of bias made at the sentencing hearing. The
implications of the challenge were clear: if the majority
were entertaining only the former, more narrow, principle,
a legislature could easily respond by simply increasing the
relevant statutory offense range and redrafting the
sentencing scheme to convert factors which formerly were
maximum increasing to factors that were necessary to
reach the new statutory maximums; if the majority were
67. See id. at 265 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)).
68. See id. at 265-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing Almendarez-Torres
v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (holding statutory maximum sentence may
be increased by sentencing hearing finding of recidivism)).
69. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 265-68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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entertaining the latter, more expansive position, then any
sentencing scheme where a fact-finding might have a
necessary effect on the sentence imposed would be invalid.
The federal sentencing guidelines would be immediately
rendered presumptively unconstitutional.7 0  Thus, the
dissent implied, the position the majority entertained was
either formalistic and empty, or would force states to
return to systems of indeterminate sentencing where the
trial judge's discretion was vast and inconsistency rife.
The majority did not accept the dissents' challenge to
seize one or the other horn of the dilemma. Instead, the
majority responded with language that simultaneously
denied that its tentative position was in tension with
sentencing schemes generally (without explaining
specifically why) and warned that if there were such a
tension, the sentencing schemes would have to yield to the
requirements of the Constitution. The Court stated:
[Tihe dissent suggests that our decision will unsettle the
efforts of many States to bring greater consistency to their
sentencing practices through ... administratively
established guidelines governing sentencing decisions. The
dissent's concern is misplaced for several reasons....
[Elven if we assume that the question we raise will someday
be followed by the answer the dissenters seem to fear, that
answer would in no way hinder the States (or the National
Government) from choosing to pursue policies aimed at
rationalizing sentencing practices. If the constitutional
concern we have expressed should lead to a rule requiring
jury determination of facts that raise a sentencing ceiling,
that rule would in no way constrain legislative authority to
identify the facts relevant to punishment or to establish
fixed penalties. . . .[While we disagree with the dissent's
dire prediction about the effect of our decision on the States'
ability to choose certain sentencing policies, it should go
70. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1998-99). In Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the Congress, in
establishing the Federal Sentencing Commission and federal sentencing
guidelines, neither made an improper delegation nor violated the separation of
powers principle. The Court did not consider whether the guidelines violated any
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
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without saying that, if such policies conflict with safeguards
enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the
accused, those policies have to yield to the constitutional
guarantees.71
When it comes time to fish or cut bait, as it will when
the Court considers Apprendi, will the three remaining
members of the Jones majority-Justices Souter, O'Connor,
and Thomas-find the constitutional doubt expressed in
Jones to have been a false alarm or find that the
Constitution precludes a legislature from empowering a
trial court at sentencing to find facts that have the effect of
raising or altering the range of penalties to which the
defendant is exposed? Or will it adopt the "formalistic"
position that a legislature may allocate such fact-finding to
the sentencing phrase of adjudication, so long as it also
increases the statutory maximum in the definition of the
offense so that the fact found at sentencing does not
increase the maximum (even if it is a necessary condition
for reaching the maximum)?
By taking the position they did in Jones, this bloc of
the Court demonstrated that they did not feel strongly
bound by the Court's prior jurisprudence in the area.
Nevertheless, if history can be used as a guide, it is more
likely than not that they will pull back from holding that
the Constitution places significant substantive limits on
the extent to which sentence-determining facts can be
established at the sentencing phase (which limits cannot be
evaded through resetting statutory maximums and
relabeling sentencing-enhancement factors as sentencing-
maximum necessary-conditions). With Patterson, the
Comrt indicated its unwillingness to pursue a path at least
suggested by Mullaney: a substantive inquiry into the
content of affirmative defenses to determine which were
"really" offense elements. Such an inquiry would likely
have produced catastrophic results for the nation's criminal
justice system as wide swaths of defenses were reassigned
71. Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 n.11.
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to the prosecution.
Likewise, it can be expected that the Court will be
exceedingly reluctant to accept the dissent's challenge and
invalidate state and federal sentencing guidelines
generally. Indeed, to accept the constitutional principle
advanced by the Jones majority would seem to commit the
Court to overhauling the nation's rules of substantive
criminal law as well. If a legislature cannot establish
sentencing factors that would increase the penalty range to
which the defendant was exposed, then neither should it be
able to establish that the lack of these factors is an
affirmative defense that the defendant will have to prove.
If a fact is an offense element by virtue of its sentence-
increasing effect, then it must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Because the facts establishing or
negating affirmative defenses affect the range of penalties
a defendant is exposed to, the proof of such facts would
have to be reallocated to the prosecution. Contrary to
precedent, 2 all affirmative defenses that involve any
degree of burden shifting would become constitutionally
suspect.
It is also possible that the Court will reach a
compromise which will allow some facts bearing on
sentencing range to be determined at the sentencing
phrase, but will require other facts to be determined only at
trial with the full panoply of constitutional protections.
The Court has already (narrowly) upheld the use of
recidivism as a factor that may be determined at
sentencing and will increase the sentencing range to which
a defendant is exposed. 3 The use of recidivism, however, is
relatively noncontroversial since recidivism (1) is a
traditional sentencing factor, (2) is not related to the
underlying events for which the defendant is prosecuted
72. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (upholding requirement that
defendant prove self-defense by preponderance of evidence); Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790 (1952) (upholding requirement that defendant prove insanity beyond
a reasonable doubt).




and which the jury generally determines, and (3) will
seldom be disputed. 4 The existence of bias presents a
stronger case for being treated as an element of the offense.
Although bias is neither a traditional sentencing factor nor
a traditional element, it is a mental state of the sort that
juries traditionally find. Furthermore, as Justice Kennedy
noted in his dissent in Jones, factors inherent in the
conduct itself, such as the perpetrator's mental state-as
opposed to factors outside the perpetrator's immediate
control, such as his criminal record-are more
appropriately left to the jury.7 5 Finally, because bias
arguably goes to the moral culpability of the defendant and
so is stigmatizing, its ascription to a defendant deserves
the procedural protections appropriate for standard offense
elements. Consequently, if the Court follows a middle road
according to which the nature of the fact at issue will
determine whether it must be treated as an offense
element, bias will likely come out an offense element.
b. The Merits of Using Bias as a Sentencing
Factor
If the Constitution permits bias to be used as a
sentencing factor to increase the range of potential
sentences, the question remains whether this approach
should be adopted. The next part of this article considers
various doctrinal implications of treating bias as a
sentencing factor, some of which favor the defendant. Here
I will discuss considerations that do not involve other code
provisions.
Regardless whether bias is an offense element or a
sentencing factor, the bottom-line is the same: When found,
bias will result in a longer sentence for the defendant.
Thus, to the extent bias crimes warrant penalty
enhancements, the retributive, rehabilitative, and
preventative rationales for punishment are equally
74. See id. at 243-44.
75. 526 U.S. at 270 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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satisfied regardless whether bias is determined at trial or
at a sentencing hearing. Furthermore, on the plausible
assumption that potential bias criminals would as likely
know of bias offense-based enhancements as bias
sentencing-based ones, general deterrence also will be
equally achieved. Nevertheless, it has been argued that it
is necessary for bias to be incorporated into the criminal
law as an offense element rather than a sentencing factor
in order for society to make a sufficiently clear statement
concerning its disapproval of bias crimes. According to
Frederick Lawrence, "[W]hen bias crime legislation
becomes law, [t]his act of law-making constitutes a societal
condemnation of racism, religious intolerance, and other
forms of bigotry. 7 6  Conversely, "if bias crimes are not
expressly punished in a criminal justice system.., a
message is expressed by the legislation, a message that
racial harmony and equality are not among the highest
values held by the community."77  On the basis of the
expressive value of punishment, Lawrence concludes that
"not only are bias crime laws warranted,... they are
essential."78
The differential expressive effect of bias as an offense
element and bias as a sentencing factor are difficult to
gauge, and Lawrence makes no effort to do so. Certainly
putting before the jury the issue whether the defendant
was motivated by bias would make a powerful statement to
the jurors about the significance our society attributes to
bias motivated crimes. Treating bias as a sentencing factor,
however, would not preclude the fact of the defendant's
bias motivation from being demonstrated at trial for
example, as part of the prosecution's proof of purpose. In
any event, a jury is a relatively narrow audience. It would
seem unlikely that the general public's ear would be
sensitive enough to distinguish between, on one hand, a
person's being convicted as a bias criminal and being
sentenced and, on the other, a person's being convicted and
76. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 167.
77. Id. at 168.
78. Id. at 163.
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being sentenced as a bias criminal. It seems equally
unlikely that the term "bias crime" would fade from our
cultural vocabulary if there were no bias-based offenses,
just bias-based sentences. Accordingly, viewed from the
perspective of traditional theories of punishment, it makes
little difference whether bias is incorporated into a penal
code as an offense element or a sentencing factor.
B. Bias Crime Laws as Provisions of the Specific Part
Thus far I have discussed bias crime laws as they
might be established through the modification of the Model
Penal Code's general part. Bias crime laws, however, have
a fair claim to being incorporated into the M.P.C.'s specific
part. As discussed earlier, bias crimes, unlike most
offenses, are frequently defined in terms of other crimes
and so are derivative offenses. In this sense, they resemble
the M.P.C.'s attempt provision which defines attempts
derivatively. 9 The attempt provision clearly belongs in the
General Part because it establishes a general formula for
determining whether any specific offense has been
attempted. Yet bias crimes laws differ from attempts in a
significant respect. Attempts are defined in terms of the
absence of some element of the offense, such as a necessary
result or attendant circumstance. Attempts of different
specific offenses therefore have nothing in common, except
in the Pickwickian sense of all lacking something. Even
here, however, there is no commonality for attempts of
diferent offenses may lack different substantive features
depending on the offense. Attempted assault is no more
similar to attempted perjury than completed assault is
similar to completed perjury.
In contrast, bias crimes share a substantive common
feature: the existence of bias. Earlier I discussed the
increased culpability that some would ascribe to the
perpetrators of bias crimes simply by virtue of their
particularly offensive motive. But there is another equally
79. See Model Penal Code § 5.01 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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powerful understanding of bias crimes that supplies an
alternative rationale for their enhanced punishment.
According to this alternative explanation, bias crimes are
more harmful than similar crimes committed for other
reasons. It is not that bias crimes involve harms greater in
degree than the harms typically associated with the
underlying offense. If bias assaults were simply more
injurious than generic assaults, they could be effectively
prosecuted as aggravated assaults. Rather, bias crimes, it
is claimed, involve unique social harms that are not
specifically addressed by the usual range of specific
offenses.80
I have elsewhere labeled these additional harms
"secondary harms," because they both rest upon and go
beyond the "primary" harms that most specific offenses are
defined in terms of.8' The secondary harms associated with
bias crimes may be divided into three categories: those
suffered by the primary victim; those suffered by persons
who share the characteristics of the primary victim that
caused her to be targeted (the "victim's group"); and those
suffered by society generally. Harms in the first category
include the psychological trauma and resultant defensive
responses that come from being victimized based on a
characteristic essential to one's self-identity. Harms in the
second category include the vicarious anxiety, fear,
withdrawal, and hostility experienced by members of the
victim's group upon learning of the bias motivation of the
crime's perpetrator. Harms in the third category include
loss of cultural and social interchange, productivity, and
general flourishing that occurs when the identity of diverse
groups becomes defined by incidents of violence and
antagonism.82
80. See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 58-63.
81. See Dillof, supra note 6, at 1049-51.
82. It is sometimes suggested that the purpose of bias crime laws is to convey
a message about the societal unacceptability of bigotry and hate-based conduct.
See, e.g., Staff Project, Crimes Motivated by Hatred: The Constitutionality and
Impact of Hate Crime Legislation in the United States 1 Syr. J. Leg.& Pol'y 29, 63
(1995) ("Essentially, hate crime statutes serve to increase the sentences for
crimes motivated by racial, ethnic, and religious bias in an effort to promote
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If the occurrence of such secondary harms provides the
beat justification for the enhanced punishments imposed by
bias crime laws, the bias crime provisions of a model penal
code belong in the specific part. The M.P.C.'s specific part
is organized around threats to different broad categories of
interests: "Offenses involving danger to the person,"
"Offenses against property," "Offenses against the family,"
etc.s The specific crimes within these categories may be
identified with threats to specific interests, such as life,
freedom of movement, and sexual autonomy. As discussed,
inchoate offenses, such as attempts, are not associated with
harm to a particular interest and so are found in the
general part. Bias crimes, of course, are not defined in
terms of any particular social harm. A bias crime is
complete when a crime is committed because of bias,
regardless of whether the particular bias threatens any
societal concern. In this manner, the definition of a bias
crime differs from, for example, the definition of assault
which explicitly requires physical harm to a person to
occur, be risked, or be threatened. 4 Nevertheless, bias may
be understood as a proxy for secondary harms. The use of
such a proxy may be justified on the ground that secondary
harms are essentially diffuse and cumulative, thus making
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of their occurrence
impractical. 5 Understood as a proxy for secondary harms,
bias crimes laws become secondary harm laws. A provision
prohibiting bias crimes would then belong in the specific
part, perhaps within M.P.C. article 250, "Offenses Against
Public Order and Decency."
public awareness that conduct based on bigotry and prejudice will not be
tolerated."). This rationale for bias crime laws appears to presume the validity of
the harm or culpability theories of bias crimes presented above. If bias crimes are
no more harmful than generic crimes, and those who commit them are no more
culpable than generic criminals, the message conveyed by bias crime statutes that
bias warrants particular condemnation would be deceptive.
88. Model Penal Code §§ 210.0-213.6, 220.1-224.14, 230.1- 230.5 (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985).
84. See id. § 211.1.
85. See Dillof, Punishing Bias, supra note 6, at 1057-59. (discussing the merits
of this claim).
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The subsequent sections examine the doctrinal
implications of treating bias crime laws as specific offenses.
In particular, how bias crime laws as specific offenses
would interact with the M.P.C.'s general provisions is
explored.
1. Bias Crimes and Complicity
Assume that a section is inserted into the M.P.C.'s
specific part that established bias crimes as a distinct
offense. An actual bias crime provision would have to
define precisely the nature of the mental state necessary
for a bias crime, including the range of victim
characteristics this state would have to be directed toward
and the required nexus between this state and the actor's
conduct. For ease of exposition, I shall pass over these
issues and base my discussion on a section that simply
provides that "a person commits a bias crime when he
commits a crime because of bias." How would such a
section be applied to situations where one or more actor is
involved in a crime but not every actor is motivated by
bias?
a. Unbiased Accessory, Biased Principal
Let us consider two cases involving an accessory before
the fact who directs that a crime be committed and a
principal in the first degree who carries out the direction.
In the first case, the accessory is unbiased and the
principal is biased. We might imagine the boss of a local
mob who orders an underling to commit a crime of some
sort to divert the police from the neighborhood of a planned
bank robbery, or a loan shark who pressures a bankrupt
client into committing a theft, or a gang leader who
requires, as condition of initiation to the gang, that a
would-be member deface property of some type. These
individuals, though acting culpably to promote crime, are
not acting in any way because of bias. In contrast, we
might imagine that the underling, the bankrupt debtor, or
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the aspiring gang member is racist, anti-Semitic, or
homophobic and so selects his victim to assault, house to
burglarize, or property to vandalize based on bigoted
values. To make the case stronger for acting "because of
bias," we might imagine that the principal had a
predilection to engage in the crime all along, but the
encouragement of the accessory was the condition that
spurred him to act at that time. There is no reason to
believe that the requirement of acting "because of bias"
requires such a high degree of bias motivation that the
possibility of an encouraging accessory before the fact is
ruled out as a matter of law. In these cases, the principal
is straightforwardly liable for a bias crime. What about the
accessory?
There are two possible theories for holding the
accessory liable. This is so because both the definition of a
bias crime and the definition of an accomplice are
derivative ones. Thus, in theory, liability for a bias crime
might equally be established first based on the complicity
provision to establish liability for the underlying crime and
then based on the bias crime provision, or vice-versa.
Pursuant to the first theory, the accessory of course is
liable for the underlying crime committed by the principal.
The fact that the accessory committed it through the act of
another is irrelevant under the M.P.C. Promoting
prohibited conduct is just another way of engaging in
prohibited conduct. The accessory thus has committed an
offinse and so fulfilled the threshold requirement for
committing a bias crime. The accessory, however, by
hypothesis, has not acted because of bias. He has acted to
cause the police to be diverted, to secure a profit, or to
maintain the cohesion of the gang. Thus, though he is a
perpetrator of the underlying crime, he cannot be, we
might say, the bias-perpetrator of that crime.
The analysis is less clear, however, with respect to the
second theory of accessory liability. The principal has
committed a bias crime. Even if not a biased accomplice to
a crime, could the accessory be considered an accomplice to
the bias crime itself and so derivatively liable for a bias
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crime? For simplicity, let us assume the underlying crime
is a conduct crime and so the principal has committed a
bias conduct crime. To determine whether the accessory is
liable, M.P.C. section 2.06(3)(a) must be consulted.
According to this subsection, a person must act "with the
purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense."" Because this subsection does not require bias
itself, merely a purpose of a particular type, it is possible
that a person might be liable for a bias crime even if not
himself biased. For example, a person who disliked society
generally might urge a friend to commit a bias crime so
that a cycle of violence between different racial groups
would be initiated. Such a person, although himself not
biased, would be liable for a bias crime via section 2.06.
This result-the liability of an unbiased person for a bias
crime-is no more unusual than the consequence that a
woman may be liable for rape under the M.P.C. by
encouraging or aiding a man to engage in the prohibited
conduct. Complicity provisions frequently expand the
potentially class of perpetrators.
In the hypotheticals we have been considering
however, the accessory is not interested in a bias crime in
particular being committed. Might he still be liable as an
accomplice to a bias crime? The answer here depends on
the scope of "offense" as used in section 2.06(3)(a). The
Commentary to this subsection states "[To be an
accomplice,] the actor must have a purpose with respect to
the proscribed conduct or the proscribed result, with his
attitude towards the circumstances to be left to the
resolution of the courts."87 The M.P.C. defines "conduct" as
"action or commission and its accompanying mental
state."8 Thus, it may be argued that in order for a person
to be an accomplice to a bias crime, he must have the
purpose, i.e., conscious object, that the principle be
motivated by bias. Here it may be objected that purpose is
86. Model Penal Code § 2.06(3)(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
87. Id. § 2.06 cmt. at 311.
88. Id. § 1.13(5).
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only defined with respect to the material element of an
offense, 9 and mental states, while elements, are not
material elements (for it would make no sense to require,
pursuant to section 2.01, a type of culpability with respect
to the very mental states that create culpability). To this
objection, however, it may be retorted that unlike most
mental elements, bias relates in part to the "harm or evil,
incident to the conduct, sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense."0 Indeed, if bias crimes carried
enhanced penalties because they involve secondary harms,
bias relates directly to the harm sought to be prevented.
Under this analysis, then, the accessory mob boss, loan
shark, or gang leader, lacking the purpose that the
principal act from bias, would not be liable for a bias crime.
There is, however, an alternative analysis available. It
starts from the premise that bias in the context of crime
does not, as do most mental states relevant to criminal law,
establish moral culpability, but instead serves as a proxy
for secondary harms. Understood in this light, engaging in
an assault because of bias is analogous to engaging in the
assault of an African-American while in a Ku Klux Klan
outfit or engaging in an assault with a deadly weapon. In
both these cases, because of a factor in addition to the
assault, there is a likelihood of additional harm to the
victim (psychological harm or death) and harm to others
(African-Americans or bystanders). The possession of a
deadly weapon, which would convert an assault into an
aggravated assault, would most likely be considered an
attendant circumstance. 91 Certainly being in a KKK outfit
would be considered an attendant circumstance. Similarly,
being motivated by bias, which may have an effect on the
victim like that of wearing KKK garb, may be thought of as
an attendant circumstance. If bias were considered an
attendant circumstance, the culpability that a person
would have to have with respect to it in order to be an
89. See id. § 2.02(2Xa) ("A person acts purposely with respect to a material
element of an offense when.... .") (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 1.13(10).
91. See id. § 211.
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accomplice, according the M.P.C.'s commentary, would
either be purpose or the culpability established by the
substantive offense.9 2  Bias crime laws do not explicitly
include a culpability requirement for bias, however that
state, construed as an attendant circumstance, might be
defined or understood. Therefore, applying the M.P.C.'s
default culpability rule,93  recklessness regarding the
existence of bias would suffice. Such a requirement would
not unduly restrict the scope of bias crime laws because,
except for extreme cases of unconscious bigotry, a
perpetrator of a bias crime will be aware of his bias
motivation. Under this analysis, the mob boss, loan shark,
and gang leader would be liable for committing a bias crime
if they were at least aware of a substantial risk that the
crime they encouraged would be a bias crime.94
The uncertain scope of complicity for bias crimes is a
result of the ambiguity of the M.P.C.: Should mental states
that do not relate solely to moral culpability be treated as
part of the conduct or as an attendant circumstance? The
relevance of this question is not limited to complicity for
bias crimes. The same ambiguity arises with respect to
complicity for offenses such as burglary which requires a
person who enters building to do so "with the purpose to
commit a crime therein."95 This mental state appears
92. See id. § 2.06 cmt. at 311 n.37 (There is deliberate ambiguity as to
whether the purpose requirement extends to circumstance elements of the
contemplated offense or whether, as in the case of attempts, the policy of the
substantive offense on this point should control.").
93. See id. § 2.02(3).
94. If the bias crime committed by the principal is a crime of result, the
analysis is similar. The M.P.C. §2.06(4) provides:
When causing particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice
in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of
that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to
that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.
Id. at § 2.06(4). This provision, on its face, establishes no culpability requirement
for attendant circumstances. Thus, strictly construed, it would permit liability
without any kind of culpability with respect to the attendant circumstances of the
underlying offense. Because this result cannot have been intended, the additional
culpability requirements that apply to complicity for conduct crimes should also
apply to result crimes.
95. Id. § 221.1.
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relevant because of the risk of greater harm the entry
carries with it rather than because of an increased moral
culpability for the act of entering per se. Because the issue
of the status of nonculpability mental states affects
complicity for other crimes than bias crimes, it cannot be
cured through the drafting of the bias crime provision.
Rather, a revised Model Penal Code should address this
issue through redrafting of its general definitions or section
on complicity. How it should be resolved turns on the prior
question of whether the culpability for attendant
circumstances needed for complicity will be purposiveness
or will be governed by the rule of substantive offense. 6
Because I believe that the latter approach is more sensible,
I would favor applying this principle as widely as possible,
a result that would be achieved by construing mental states
that do not establish culpability for a material element,
such as bias or the purpose of committing a felony, as
attendant circumstances rather than an aspect of conduct
that an accomplice must have as his purpose. In this way,
the mob boss, loan shark, and gang leader would be liable
for a bias crime if they were at least reckless regarding the
motivation of the principal.97
b. Biased Accessory, Unbiased Principal
There remains to be considered the case of the biased
accessory and the unbiased principal. Here we might
imagine a member of the KKK who pays a local thug-for-
hire to vandalize an African-American church. The thug is
96. See Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. at 311 n. 37 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (leaving question open).
97. The conclusion that some mental states should be considered attendant
circumstances seems most plausible in the context of complicity, where a
principal's bigoted tendencies, for example, may be thought of as a circumstance
of the accomplice's criminal activity and where the M.P.C.'s definition of conduct
as "action or commission and its accompanying mental state," id. § 1.13(5), may
be construed as defining the status of a mental state for only actor himself.
Because persons are generally aware of their mental states, it does not matter
greatly how mental states that are material elements are classified for purposes
of first-person liability.
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not biased, though he knows that the person who has hired
him to commit the crime is motivated by bias. The legal
analysis here largely tracks that of the previous section.
The only difference is that here, in order for the thug to be
derivatively liable of a bias crime, the M.P.C.'s complicity
provision must be invoked twice: Once to permit the biased
KKK member to be liable as an accomplice for the non-bias
crime committed by the principal, and once in order to
make the unbiased thug potentially liable as an accomplice
to the KKK member's bias crime.
Although the legal analysis is similar, there may be
substantive differences between the cases of the unbiased
accessory/biased principal and the biased
accessory/unbiased principal. If bias crime laws are to be
understood as resting on a theory of secondary harms, it
may be questioned whether the secondary harms that are
alleged to typically accompany bias crimes are as great
when non-biased accomplices are involved.
The answer clearly depends on the bias crime at issue.
On one hand, the effects of painting a swastika on the wall
of a synagogue likely do not depend on whether the
perpetrator was himself biased or acting on behalf of biased
accessory. On the other hand, if a person is assaulted or
property is damaged by one hired out of bias, there may be
little in the circumstances of the crime to indicate to the
victim or others that bias was behind the crime. Similarly,
if a non-biased accessory encourages a principal to commit
a crime, knowing that the victim may be selected based on
the bias of the principal, the accessory's purpose-the
diversion of the police, the obtaining of stolen property,
etc.,-may appear to be the only motivation and thus mask
the principal's bias. While proxies do not have to be
perfectly correlated with their targets, these considerations
may make the case weaker for an unbiased accomplice's
liability for a bias crime.
Finally, it should noted that if bias were treated as a
sentencing factor, rather than an element of a specific
offense, there would be no possibility of an enhanced
sentence for an unbiased accomplice to a bias crime. Even
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if an unbiased accomplice aided another to commit a crime
with the hope that it would be a bias crime, there would be
no additional liability. The accomplice would be liable for
the underlying crime but, lacking bias himself, would not
be subjected to an enhanced penalty at sentencing. In
order to avoid this conclusion, a sentencing guideline would
have to be drafted that referred explicitly to the bias of the
accomplice or otherwise extended the definition of bias to
include an actor that, per hypothesis, was without personal
bias.
2. Bias Crimes and Attempts
Like the definition of complicity, the definition of an
attempt is derivative. Whether a person has engaged in an
attempt depends largely on the requirements of the
substantive offense that she is alleged to have attempted.
Because bias crime laws are also derivative, a similar set of
definitional issues arises with respect to the interplay of
bias crimes and attempts as arose with respect to the
interplay of bias crimes and complicity. These issues turn
on the fact that there are two possible ways that an
attempt provision and a bias crime provision might
combine. Just as a participant in a bias crime might fall
into either the category of a bias-accomplice to a crime or
an accomplice to a bias crime, so an incomplete bias crime
might be characterized as either a bias attempted-crime or
an attempted bias crime.
Consider the case of a person who is apprehended on
his way to planting a firebomb at a mosque because he
despises Moslems. He has committed the crime of
attempted arson, and he has done so because of bias. If
bias crimes are defined as "crimes committed because of
bias," he theoretically could be prosecuted for the crime of
bias attempted-arson, analogous to the crime of bias-arson
(an arson committed because of bias). Alternatively, he has
"with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense" taken "a substantial step in the
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission
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of the crime,"9g here the crime of bias-arson. Thus he
theoretically could be prosecuted for attempted bias-arson.
The distinction between an attempted bias crime and a
bias attempted crime is more than terminological. How the
unsuccessful effort to destroy the mosque is characterized
will likely affect the size of the bias penalty enhancement.
In many jurisdictions, the range of punishments for an
attempted offense is half that of the completed offense.9
For purposes of illustration, assume that the maximum
penalty for arson is twenty-years imprisonment and that
the maximum penalty enhancement for a bias crime is an
additional ten-years imprisonment. It follows that when a
person commits a bias-arson, he faces a penalty of up to
thirty years. If a person who merely takes a substantial
step toward committing such a crime is charged with
attempting to commit a bias-arson, he will be exposed to
half of that maximum penalty, or fifteen years. In contrast,
if the perpetrator is charged instead with bias attempted-
arson, he would be exposed to a sentence of ten years for
attempted arson plus a ten years enhancement for bias,
yielding a maximum possible sentence of twenty years.' 0
Which is the better analysis of situations where crimes
are attempted because of bias will depend, once again, on
whether bias is better understood as a mental state
increasing an actor's culpability for a given harm (or
wrongdoing) or a mental state that serves as a proxy for
increased harm (or wrongdoing) in the form of secondary
harms. If bias is understood to increase culpability, the
50% failure discount for attempts should apply
straightforwardly in the manner that it does for crimes
involving a lesser level of culpability, such as generic arson.
Thus a maximum sentence of fifteen years would be
98. Id. § 5.01(1).
99. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 664 (West 1970); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-2-101
(1978); Criminal Code of 1961, §§ 8- 4, IlM. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 8-4 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1980-1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2923.02 (Anderson 1975).
100. Although the Model Penal Code's sentencing provision for attempts would
not create such disparities, the M.P.C.'s general failure to award a "failure
discount" for attempts is so unusual that it is unlikely to be retained without an
alternative provision in a revised code.
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appropriate. The crime would be characterized as an
attempted bias-crime. The requirements of attempt would
be met because the perpetrator had the necessary
culpability (bias) and took a substantial step toward the
completion of the conduct establishing bias-arson. In
contrast, if bias is understood to increase harm, even in the
case of a failed attempt, the same amount of bias arguably
exists, implying the same amount of resultant secondary
harms. Thus, the crime would be characterized as a bias
attempted-arson and a maximum sentence of twenty years
would be appropriate. Here the crime of attempted arson
would be established simply based on the perpetrator's
purpose to commit the conduct constituting arson.
Of course, it may be responded that in the case of a
failed attempt where there is no "primary harm," bias will
be a particularly poor proxy for secondary harms. The
intended victim may only learn of the attempt after the
perpetrator has been apprehended and incapacitated. The
fear of being targeted again based on an often
unconcealable characteristic like race or national origin is
greatly diminished. Because the target of the bias crime
will feel less aggrieved, the vicarious reaction of the
victim's group will be proportionately less. If such is the
case, it may be sensible to revise the definition of a bias
crime to "a completed crime committed because of bias."
Such a formulation would preclude liability for a bias
attempted crime. A person, however, would still be liable
for attempting a bias crime, which as noted, would carry
only a discounted enhancement for bias. This discounted
penalty would appear to be a more fair one given the
decreased secondary harms expected from a failed bias
crime. It would also be consistent with the penalty
enhancement recommended by the culpability theory of
bias crime laws (just as the penalty enhancement for
completed bias crimes is consistent with both culpability
and secondary harm theories). In contrast, if bias were
treated as a sentencing factor, and the same limitation to
completed crimes were placed on it, no enhancement at all
would be imposed. The defendant could only be convicted
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for an attempted crime and bias enhancement at
sentencing would not occur. Treating bias as an offense
element, therefore, permits a more appropriate range of
punishments to be established.
3. Bias Crimes and Divergent Results
Failed attempts are one example of how an intended
bias crime may go awry from the point of view of the
perpetrator. A second example are cases of divergent
results. A racist throws a rock from a moving car at the
house of an Asian family that has recently moved into his
community, but the rock misses and hits a neighbor's
flowerpot. A homophobe picks a fight with a gay man,
swings at him, but, because the gay man ducks, the
homophobe hits the woman standing beside him. Should
these crimes be considered completed bias crimes and
punished accordingly?
Subsections 2.03(2) and (3) are the provisions of the
M.P.C. designed to handle cases where the actual result
diverges from the intended result.1 1 Pursuant to these
subsections, certain results that were not, strictly
speaking, desired or contemplated by the perpetrator are
deemed to be desired or intended. While the moral validity
of this artificial extension of the perpetrator's purpose or
conscious risk-taking has been questioned, 10 2 it is generally
thought that the resultant punishment for a complete
crimes is not disproportionately harsh.03 Under these
sections, a person who acted from bias and as a
consequence injured an unintended victim would still be
liable for the underlying crime, just as a person who acted
based on any other motivation would be liable for injury to
an unintended victim. Assuming that a bias crime is
101. Model Penal Code §2.03(2)-(3) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
102. See Anthony M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of
Criminal Culpability, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 501 (1998).
103. See e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Transferred Intent, 10 Notre Dame J.L.
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 65 (1996).
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defined as "a crime committed because of bias," the
perpetrator, considered to have committed the underlying
crime through the operation of subsections 2.03(2)-(3), also
would be liable as for a bias crime because he acted from
bias.
The appropriateness of this result may be questioned.
Perhaps if another Asian family owned the flowerpot the
rock hit, or the bystander injured was also gay, we might
describe what happened as a bias crime. Where the actual
victim does not possess the characteristic that is the target
of the perpetrator's animus, however, we are more likely to
described what has happened as an attempted bias crime
than as a completed bias crime. This result makes sense if
bias crimes are thought of as specific offenses designed to
deter and punish the culpable causing of secondary harms.
Certainly, the actual victim will not experience the adverse
reaction that the intended victim would have felt had he
been the victim of the bias attack. The actual victim will
not "take it personally." Furthermore, as in the previously
discussed case of attempted bias crimes with no victims,
the secondary harms to the victim's group and society that
flow from an attempt to commit a bias crime where the
intended target is not injured tend, as a categorical matter,
to be less severe than those where the target victim is
injured.
Various drafting strategies are available for avoiding
bias crime liability for the perpetrator in these divergent
result cases. Bias crimes laws are commonly formulated to
require that the crime be committed "because of...
race,... religion,... nationality" [or other specified
characteristic] of the victim. 0 4 This requirement will result
in no liability for a completed bias crime in those cases
where the actual victim does not possess the characteristic
that the intended victim had and which was the basis for
the crime. The requirement, however, is too broad. It
would exclude many paradigm bias crimes which have
104. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:107.2 (West 1998); see also N.C. Gen.
Stat. §14-3(c) (1993); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080 (1996).
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significant secondary harms associated with them.
Consider the case of a swastika spray-painted on a
sidewalk or a racially derogatory phrase scrawled on the
entrance to a hotel. Here, the actual victim-the
municipality or owner of the hotel-need not possess the
characteristic of the group that the perpetrator wishes to
disturb. Similarly, the vandalizing of the office of a civil
rights activist or the mailing of death threats to the white
spouse of an African-American celebrity would not
necessarily be crimes motivated by the race, religion, etc. of
the victim; these crimes, which involve significant
secondary harms, would be motivated by the position,
beliefs, or status of the victim. In order to avoid these
limitations on bias crimes, yet to exclude cases of divergent
results not within the actor's biased objective, a provision
might establish bias crime liability where "an actor because
of a person' or persons' membership in a race, religion,
nationality [or other specified group classification] commits
a crime adversely affecting one or more members of that
race, religion, nationality [or other specified group
classification]." Pursuant to this formulation, the person
the perpetrator adversely affects need not be the actual
victim of the underlying crime. As long as the person
affected is a member of the targeted group, there will be
liability. If, however, a person of an unintended race,
religion, or nationality were adversely affected, as in the
hypotheticals beginning this section, there would be no
liability because the person adversely affected (the actual
crime victim) was not adversely affected because of his race
or other specified characteristic.
4. Bias Crimes and Lesser Forms of Culpability
In the previous section, it was questioned whether an
act may constitute a "crime" for the purpose of an M.P.C.
bias-crime provision where a crime is only established
pursuant to the effect of section 2.03(2). Likewise, it may be
questioned whether "crime" includes those offenses that
may be established with levels of culpability other than
384
BIAS CRIME LAWS
purpose. The Model Penal Code frequently permits
liability based on proof of knowledge or recklessness and
occasionally upon proof of negligence. 10 5  As discussed
below, a provision that employed the common "because of'
locution would likely create bias-crime liability for crimes
of knowledge, recklessness, and negligence where bias was
involved.
The paradigm cases of committing crimes because of
bias, such as assault or intimidation, involve purposeful
criminal conduct motivated by animosity toward the victim
because of her race, religion, or other specified
choracteristic. In such situations, bias acts as a
consideration that motivates the perpetrator's illegal
action. Nevertheless, there is nothing incoherent about
bias crimes involving forms of culpability other than
purpose. Acting knowingly, recklessly, and negligently all
suggest an acceptance or culpable inadvertence with
respect to a potential harm or condition. If such an
acceptance or culpable inadvertence were a function of the
race or religion of the potential victim, it could be said that
the perpetrator had committed a bias crime of knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence. Consider for example the case
of a bigot who knowingly sells contaminated narcotics to
persons in an African-American neighborhood, but who
would not have done so in his own neighborhood. Or
consider the case of an anti-Semite who recklessly drives at
an unsafe speed through the streets of a Jewish
community, but who would not have done so in his own
community. In these cases, bias does not act as a
motivation, but acts to negate what would otherwise be a
105. Recklessness will suffice to establish certain result crimes, see, e.g., Model
Penal Code, §210.3(1)(a) (manslaughter) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985), and conduct crimes, see, e.g., id. § 211.2 (recklessly endangering another
person), as well as being a sufficient form of culpability with respect to many
attendant circumstances, see, e.g., id. §221.1(1) (burglary) (attendant
circumstance of entering an occupied structure). Negligence will some times
suffice for some result crimes, see, e.g., id. §§ 210.4(1) (negligent homicide),
211.1(1)(b) (assault with a deadly weapon) or attendant circumstance, see, e.g., id.
§ 218.6(1) (age of victim of sexual offense). Where recklessness or negligence will
suffice, so will knowledge. See id. § 2.02(5).
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constraining consideration, e.g., respect for the safety or
health of another person. Even in cases of inadvertence, it
is possible to speak of biased action. If a perpetrator would
have paid more attention to the presence of the victim had
the victim been of his own group, his negligence would be
because of bias. While "because of' may indicate the
presence of a reason, it is also frequently used to indicate
the presence of a causal factor. Thus it may be said, in the
causal sense of "because of," that because of bias, a bias
crime of negligence was committed.
Because crimes of lesser levels of culpability may be
coherently treated as bias crimes does not imply that they
should be. To the extent that the punishment imposed on a
perpetrator is limited by the perpetrator's desert, increased
levels of punishment should be tied to increased harm or
increased culpability for harm. Assuming acting based on
bias is particularly blameworthy (or at least generally
perceived to be by society), my sense is that in the context
of lesser forms of culpability, such as recklessness and
negligence, bias is proportionally less significant. Merely
being relatively indifferent to a person's welfare, or
inattentive with respect to that person, is less objectionable
than actively desiring ill for that person. When bias is at
the root of such recklessness or negligence, it plays a less
significant role than when it is at the root of purposeful
harming. Furthermore, other things equal, the gravity of
the secondary harms that results from an act involving bias
should be a function of the amount of increased culpability
for the act because of the role of bias. The impact on the
victim, the victim's group, and society at large of a bias
crime largely comes from the perception that the victim has
been done a greater wrong or injustice, or at least that it
will be so perceived by the victim. Stated conversely, if
bias were perceived as a type of motivation no worse or no
more immoral than others, it is unlikely that acts based on
them would be considered particularly demeaning,
harmful, or inciting. Accordingly, it is likely that the
secondary harms produced by non-purposeful bias crimes
will, like their culpability, be proportionately less serious.
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Because of the lesser harm and culpability associated
with crimes of bias negligence and bias recklessness, it may
be appropriate to exclude them from a bias crime provision,
while permitting the presence of bias to bear on the
defendant's sentence within the general sentencing range
for crimes of recklessness or negligence. This result could
most easily be achieved by making explicit the requirement
that bias be an affirmative motive, a reason for acting, not
merely a factor permitting or causing negligence or
recklessness. Such a section might, for example, provide
that a person commits a bias crime "by engaging in a crime
motivated by bias" or "by committing a crime for purpose of
adversely affecting a person of a particular race, religion,
ethnicity [or other specified characteristic]." Both
formulations imply that bias gives the perpetrator a reason
to act, in contrast to the broader term "because of."
5. Bias Crimes and Defenses
The final issue concerning the relation of a specific-
offense bias crime provision to the provisions of the
M.P.C.'s general part is the interplay of bias crimes and
defenses. Defenses are properly characterized as
components of the general part of the criminal law because
they apply in a similar manner to all specific offenses.
There are not, for example, distinct insanity defenses for
theft and arson. Defenses, appropriately, are found in the
M.P.C.'s general part.0 6
The issue of the interplay of bias crimes and defenses
may be examined in the context of the following
hypothetical. Imagine that a hiker, lost in the woods and
desperately hungry and dehydrated, comes to a clearing
where there are two small cabins. Because they are locked,
he assumes that they have provisions or other useful items
inside. Based on the appearance of one cabin, the hiker
concludes that it is owned by a Native American, and
believing that Native Americans should "stay on the
106. See id. arts. 3, 4 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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reservation," he chooses that cabin to break into and
pillage. Assume that the hiker is aware that the biased
nature of his act may be deeply offensive to the Native
American owner of the cabin and have significant social
repercussions. How should a possible defense of choice of
evils here be evaluated?
Because bias crimes, considered as specific offenses,
are "second-order" crimes, there are two possible
approaches to analyzing this situation. First, one might
assume that the first-order crime of burglary has been
committed because of bias. Although racial animosity was
not the sole motivation of the hiker's action, it arguably
was a substantial enough factor behind the ransacking of
the Native-American's cabin to conclude that the particular
burglary occurred because of bias. One might then ask
whether the hiker's prima facie liability for a bias-burglary
can be defeated based on the choice of evils defense.
Alternatively, one might ask whether the hiker has a
choice of evils defense to the first-order crime of burglary,
and if so, conclude that because there was no crime in the
first place, he cannot be even prima facie liable for the
second-order offense of committing a bias crime.
The possibility of different analyses, of course, does not
entail the possibility of different outcomes. Whether a
robbery is conceived of as a theft in the course of an assault
or an assault in the course of a theft will not matter for
purposes of determining whether a robbery has been
committed. Nevertheless, whether the choice of evils
defense is applied to the underlying offense of burglary or
only to the bias offense may effect the liability of the
defendant.107 The substantive content of section 3.02, the
107. Here I assume that the choice of evils defense is not precluded per se by
the presence of bias. It has been suggested that M.P.C. § 3.02 requires that the
actor employ "a principle of selection that is reasonable in the circumstances,"
Kent Greenawalt, A Vice of Its Virtues: The Perils of Precision in Criminal
Codification, as Illustrated by Retreat, General Justification, and Dangerous
Utterances, 19 Rutgers L.J. 929, 938 (1988), or, at least, that in practice, such a
finding would be required. Id. at 940-41. The requirement of a reasonable
selection method, however, does not appear in the language of section 3.02.
Furthermore, there is considerable academic debate whether, as a normative
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M.P.C.'s choice of evil defense, does not vary from offense to
offense. Nevertheless, in a given situation, it may preclude
liability for some offenses but not others. Thus, in
application, it is offense-specific. Section 3.02 provides that
"[c]onduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid
harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided
that. . . the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such
conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the
law defining the offense charged . . ".o8 The harm sought
to be avoided by the law defining burglary is the violation
of a person's interest in security of her home and of her
possessions. As discussed, although bias crime laws may
be understood as based on notions of greater culpability for
a given harm, treating them as a specific offense is more
consistent with the understanding that they protect a
unique social interest-here the interest in preventing
seoondary harms. Thus, for purposes of section 3.02, the
evil sought to be prevented by "the law defining the offense
charged" would be the evil of the predicate offense plus the
evil of secondary harms.10 9 This evil will be greater than
matter, justification defenses should only be available if the actor acted for the
right reasons. See, e.g., Paul Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification:
Deeds v. Reasons, in Harm and Culpability 45 (A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith,
eds., 1996); Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, 24
Pac. L.J. 1233, 1267-82 (1993); George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law §
7.4 (1975); Russell L. Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical
Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defense, 15 Oxford J. Leg. Studies 228
(1995); Brian Hogan, The Dadson Principle, Crim. L. Rev. 679 (1989). Whether
bias in particular should always preclude a choice of evils defense is a substantive
issue beyond the scope of this article. I note, however, that the argument for
preclusion appears to rest on an enhanced-culpability theory of bias crimes, which
is a matter of principle, rather than a secondary-harms theory of bias crimes,
which rests on empirical generalizations. This section considers bias crimes as
specific offenses associated with the particular social evil of secondary harms.
Amordingly, the assumption that bias will not per se preclude the choice of evils
defense is more consistent with the above discussion.
108. Model Penal Code § 3.02(1)(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(emphasis added).
109. M.P.C. § 3.02, if interpreted literally, would seem to require the harm
sought to be avoided to be measured against the harm sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense charged in a manner that would not permit the
aggregation of the harms associated with multiple offenses where a person was
charge with multiple offenses. Thus, if a person in the course of a kidnapping
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just the evil sought to be avoided by the predicate offense.
Assuming bias crime laws are treated as specific offenses,
how the choice of evils defense is applied-either to the
underlying crime directly or to the bias crime only-
therefore may matter.
If bias crimes were defined as "crimes committed
because of bias," the choice of evils defense likely would be
applied without taking into account the secondary harms
associated with bias crimes. Under the M.P.C., the
elements of the offense of burglary include facts that
negative a justification for the conduct, such as facts that
establish a choice of evils defense.110 Strictly speaking, a
burglary for which a defense exists is not a burglary at all,
nor a crime, much less a possible bias crime. In order for
the secondary harms associated with bias crimes to be
taken into account, a bias crime provision would have to be
formulated in terms of (1) the commission of prohibited
conduct, or (2) the causing of prohibited results, (3) in
specified attendant circumstances, (4) with the required
type of culpability, without regard to the existence of facts
that would negative a potential justification or excuse.
Such a provision threatens to become unwieldy.
George Fletcher has bemoaned the fact that criminal
law theory has no commonly accepted term to describe
concisely such a collection of facts. He has suggested that
the phrase "definition of the offense" be used to refer to all
the elements of an offense but those necessary to preclude a
defense from being established."' Adopting this
injures a person, destroys a building, and causes a riot, the question would be
whether the evil he sought to avoid would outweigh the harm associated with
each offenses considered individually. This result seems irrational because it
would relieve from liability those who knowing cause more aggregate harm than
they avoid. Fortunately, this issue is avoided in the case of bias crimes considered
as specific offenses. The enhanced penalties associated with such crimes indicates
that they are intended to prevent the underlying crime as much as the secondary
harms that the biased commission of the underlying crime might cause.
110. Model Penal Code § 1.13(9)(d) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
111. See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 554 (proposing "definition" and rejecting




terminology, a bias crime might be defined to occur where
"because of bias a person acts in a manner establishing the
definitional elements of a crime." In this manner, a
defense to the predicate crime would not be relevant for
determining bias crime liability, and the determination of
bias crime liability would depend on whether the harm the
person seeks to avoid is greater than the total harm
(including the secondary harms) that he believes will result
from his act. The hiker's knowledge of the effects of his
biased action then might be taken into account in assessing
his liability.
The fact that a bias crime provision may be drafted to
make secondary harms relevant to the application of the
choice of evil defense leaves open the question of whether
this approach should be adopted. If one believed that bias
crimes laws were not intended to prevent a distinct type of
harm, but merely to punish more based on the increased
culpability of the perpetrator for a given harm, this
drafting approach would make no sense. There would be
no possible difference in outcome to motivate the revision
suggested above. The balancing of harms would come out
the same. Likewise, this drafting option would be
inappropriate if it were thought that there were
significantly less severe secondary harms associated with
those bias crimes based on a predicate crime for which
there was a defense.
To return to the hypothetical presented at the
beginning of this section, is it likely that the Native
American would be less disturbed, and other Native
Americans would feel less concerned, because the hiker was
trying to save his own life? It might be argued, on one
hand, that in this case, the hiker's bias in choosing the
Native American's cabin would likely be masked by the
surrounding circumstances. The hiker's conduct would
only ambiguously manifest bias because of the possibility
that his choice of which cabin to burglarize was random.
On the other hand, the fact that the hiker damaged the
cabin may be seen to imply that bias was the sole motive
behind his conduct. His claim that he was also partially
20001
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motivated by hunger and thirst may sound hollow. Even if
it is believed, the victim or his community may believe that
bias which plays a role as a partial determinant of the
hiker's actions is as insulting or threatening as bias that is
the sole cause. Because there seems to be no persuasive
reason to believe that the secondary harms in cases like
these will be less than those where there are no defenses to
the predicate crime, drafting bias crimes laws in terms of
"the definitional elements of the offense" rather than
"crimes" may be advisable.
Finally, if bias were employed as a sentencing factor,
rather than an offense element, any defense to the
predicate crime would preclude liability altogether,
irrespective of the effect of secondary harms on the balance
of evils. This may be a strong consideration in favor of
treating bias as an offense element. On the other hand,
because employing bias as a sentencing factor would, in
this respect, be beneficial to the defendant relative to
employing it as an offense element, the constitutional
concerns about employing bias as a sentencing factor would
be diminished.
III. CONCLUSION
The Model Penal Code deserves a model bias crime
provision. Such a provision should manifest those virtues
exemplified by the M.P.C. generally. It should be clear,
precise, and capable of correctly resolving the full range of
factual scenarios that it might be applied to. This article
has examined various forms that an M.P.C. bias crime
provision might take and the practical, constitutional, and
substantive implications of these forms. In the course of
this examination, a recurrent underlying issue has been:
Do bias crimes deserve enhanced punishments because of
the increased culpability of the perpetrator for the harm
associated with the underlying crime, or because of the
additional harms associated with bias crimes? The
resolution of this theoretical issue bears upon the
organizational question of whether a bias provision belongs
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in the M.P.C.'s general culpability section or of whether it
should be formulated as a specific offense. It also may bear
upon the constitutional question of whether bias may be
used as a sentencing factor determining the maximum
available penalty. Finally, it bears upon the substantive
questions of whether there should be bias crime liability in
cases involving either complicity, divergent result, attempt,
lesser culpability, or defenses. Assuming that the
additional harms associated with bias crimes provide the
best justification for bias crime laws, a second recurrent
issue has been, when will these additional harms arise
consistently enough to justify employing the perpetrator's
bias as a proxy for them? Although the article has
suggested answers to these recurrent issues, it has not
done so dogmatically or conclusively. Rather, a variety of
bias crime formulations have been offered in response to
the various moral and empirical positions that might
reasonably be held. In this way, it is hoped, a bias crime
provision worthy of the Model Penal Code can best be
developed.
POSTSCRIPT
On June 26, 2000, shortly before this article went to
press, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New
Jersey."2 Dividing 5-4, the Supreme Court struck down
New Jersey's bias-crime sentencing law. The breakdown
of the votes was foreshadowed by Jones"': Stevens, Scalia,
Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg composed the majority;
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer composed the
minority.
Consistent with the expectations of the article, the
Court in Apprendi did not commit itself to an extended
substantive inquiry into what sentencing factors, by virtue
of their nature and character, were "really" offense
elements that had to be determined at trial. Nor did it
112. 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
118. 526 U.S. 227 (1999), discussed supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
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signal that it was ready to overturn well-established
sentencing schemes, such as the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, on the ground that they allocated the finding
of various sentence-determining facts to a court rather
than a jury. Rather, the Court opted for a more limited
approach. According to the Court, "Other than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.""4 The New Jersey statute violated this rule, the
Court found, because it permitted Apprendi, a defendant
convicted of a second-degree offense, to be imprisoned for
an additional ten to twenty years based on a trial court's
finding of bias-motivation.
In invalidating the New Jersey sentencing statute
on the ground it permitted a sentence beyond the
"prescribed statutory maximum," the Supreme Court
adopted what O'Connor in her dissent characterized with
reasonable accuracy as a "formalist" approach to the
review of sentencing enhancements." 5  Whether a
sentence is valid depends on whether it is authorized
based only on the facts found by the jury, not whether the
challenged sentencing scheme was fundamentally less fair
to defendants or granted trial judges substantively greater
sentencing discretion than alternative constitutionally
permissible schemes. As discussed below, the Court did
not hold unconstitutional any scheme that might
reasonably be called a sentencing-based bias crime law.
By testing the validity of a sentencing scheme based
on whether it permitted a sentence above the statutory
maximum, the Supreme Court left open the possibility of
two forms of bias-crime sentencing laws. The first form
would impose a penalty on a defendant by establishing a
mandatory-minimum penalty within the statutory range
that would be triggered merely by a court's post-trial
finding of bias. By staying with the statutory range, such
114. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63
115. Id. at 2389.
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mandatory-minimum schemes would be consistent with
the Court's holding in Apprendi. Such a scheme, like that
in Apprendi, would often, but not inevitably, operate to
impose an enhanced penalty on bias criminals because of
their motivation as found by the trial court. Take, for
example, the case of a defendant convicted of an offense
that normally carried a penalty of ten to twenty years. In
such a case, a judge might be inclined to impose a
sentence of fifteen years, based on, inter alia, her
preponderance-of-the-evidence finding that the defendant
acted based on bias. If a mandatory-minimum scheme
were in effect, the judge might be required by statute to
impose an eighteen year sentence on that defendant,
effectively subjecting the defendant to a three-year
penalty enhancement because of a judicial finding of bias.
From the perspective of the defendant, such an
enhancement would "feel" no different than one in which a
judge imposed a sentence of eighteen years by finding bias
motivation and invoking a sentence-extending bias crime
provision to increase the defendant's sentence three years
above its normal fifteen year maximum. In both cases,
but for the operation of sentencing provisions triggered by
a mere judge-made finding of bias, the defendant who
otherwise would have received no more the fifteen years
would receive a sentence of eighteen years.
Mandatory-minimum sentencing schemes of this
type were upheld in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,"' and the
Court in Apprendi relied on McMillan without rejecting its
specific holding with respect to mandatory minimum
schemes." 7 Because both sentence-extending schemes and
mandatory-minimum schemes may have the effect of
increasing a defendant's sentence, both potentially deter,
incapacitate, and express society's condemnation of the
conduct triggering the increased sentence. Without
116. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
117. Id. at 2361 n.13. While explicitly declining to overrule McMillan, the
Court stated that "we reserve for another day the question whether stare decisis
considerations preclude reconsideration of its narrower holding [that mandatory-
minimum sentencing laws are constitutional]." Id.
20001 395
BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:341
further argument, there is no reason to believe that
sentencing schemes of the latter type triggered by a
finding a bias would be less effective than those of the
former type. Therefore, Apprendi leaves open at least one
viable form of bias-crime sentencing law.
The second possible type of sentencing-based bias
crime law is more controversial. As suggested earlier in
this article" 8 and in O'Connor's dissent," 9 a state could
circumvent Apprendi's restriction on maximum-extending
sentencing statutes by enacting a statute that
simultaneously (1) extended the maximum penalty
available for an offense, and (2) instructed that lesser
maximums be applied to all defendants but those who the
sentencing judge found acted from bias. In effect, a
defendant upon a jury finding of guilt may be told: 'You
are hereby convicted and will be sentenced to a term of
five to twenty unless it is found you did not act from bias,
in which case you will be sentenced to no more than ten."
Such a statute would technically comply with Apprendi's
requirement that a defendant's sentence not exceed "the
prescribed statutory maximum" because exactly the
statutory maximum would be prescribed for those the
court, at sentencing, finds to have acted from bias. If such
a statute is objected to on the ground that it
unconstitutionally employs conditional statutory
maximums that are triggered by judicial finding, it may be
replied that this "fault" afflicts any comprehensive
sentencing scheme that limits a judge's sentencing
discretion based on facts not found by a jury. In such
cases, the defendant is effectively sentenced to a range of
penalties conditioned upon a judge's finding of facts. The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are the all-too-obvious
example of such a scheme. In light of the possibility of
such a circumvention of Apprendi, the majority offered no
more than the unhelpful statement that in such a case,
"we would be required to question whether the revision
118. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
119. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2380.
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was constitutional under this Court's prior cases" followed
by the predictably opaque citation to Mullaney and
Patterson."O
By striking down a penal statute based on its
incompatibility with the legislatively defined and
potentially manipulable line between offense elements and
sentencing factors, Apprendi is the most recent-
incarnation of Mullaney, which tentatively began to define
the constitutional content of "offense elements." We will
have to see what happens when the next Patterson comes
along.
120. Id. at 2363 n.16. The majority also suggested that such a statute
attempting to circumvent Apprendi's limits might be blocked by "structural
democratic constraints [that] exist to discourage legislatures from enacting
[generally disproportional] penal statutes." Id. This suggestion, however, is
fairly met by O'Connor's retort that insofar as such a statute would be
functionally equivalent to the one stuck down under Apprendi, structural
democratic constraints would prove no greater a problem to it that those
overcome by the statute in Apprendi. Id. at 2389.
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